Abstract-Cyber physical systems which integrate physical system dynamics with digital cyber infrastructure are envisioned to transform our core infrastructural frameworks, such as the smart electricity grid, transportation networks, and advanced manufacturing. This integration, however, exposes the physical system functioning to the security vulnerabilities of cyber communication. Both scientific studies and real-world examples have demonstrated the impact of data injection attacks on complex systems, including the Internet, the smart electricity grid, and air traffic systems. In this paper, an abstract theoretical framework is proposed to study data injection/modification attacks on Markov modeled dynamical systems from the perspective of an adversary. Typical data injection attacks focus on one shot attacks by adversary and the non-detectability of such attacks under static assumptions. In this paper, we study dynamic data injection attacks where the adversary is capable of modifying a temporal sequence of data and the physical controller is equipped with prior statistical knowledge about the data arrival process to detect the presence of an adversary. The goal of the adversary is to modify the arrivals to minimize a utility function of the controller while minimizing the detectability of his presence as measured by the K-L divergence between the prior and posterior distribution of the arriving data. The tradeoff between these two metrics-controller utility and the detectability cost-is studied analytically for different underlying dynamics. The proposed framework is then applied to a practical problem in data networks where a router tries to hide the path of traffic flow from timing analysis by an active adversary who can modify the timing of an incoming packet stream. This problem is studied from the adversary perspective wherein the goal is to balance two costs-the adversary's detectability cost measured by the K-L divergence and the network privacy cost measured by the maximum length of the packet stream whose paths can be hidden by a memory limited router.
tems which merge traditional physical control systems with cyber communication networks are vulnerable to adversarial intrusion that aim to cripple the functioning of these systems. In particular, the integration of the cyber information layer exposes the physical system functioning to cyber security vulnerabilities which could result in tangible economic losses and physical damages to our basic infrastructural systems. Real-world incidents and scientific studies have already demonstrated the inability of the power grid to ensure a reliable service in the presence of cyber attacks [1] [2] [3] . For instance, consider the Stuxnet worm, which first came to light in 2010, and was designed to target supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that are configured to control and monitor specific industrial processes [4] . By injecting false data into the programmable logic controllers (PLC) in the SCADA systems, the worm caused critical malfunctioning of a nuclear power plant. The false injection mechanism stayed undetected for several months whilst jeopardizing a large scale energy operation. This is an example of disruption of internal physical systems through compromised external communication links. When our infrastructural systems are vulnerable to mere communication failures, an attack such as Stuxnet demonstrates the potential for large scale disruption at seemingly very little cost to an adversary. The lack of strong cyber-physical security is a severe impediment to the success of future engineering systems that integrate cyber and physical components and are envisioned to transform our critical infrastructures.
Mathematically, cyber physical systems merge the continuous time physical system dynamics with the predominantly discrete time data processing methodologies, which gives rise to modeling challenges [5] and the development of a standardized framework of analysis. Consequently, the study of cyber physical security has focused on specific systems, most notably the smart electricity grid and transportation systems, and the analysis of attacks and countermeasures within the milieu of those specific systems. These studies have typically focused on one-shot attacks where an adversary aims to alter system functioning instantaneously by injecting false data [1] , [2] , [6] [7] [8] while maintaining undetectability under a static model of the system. In this work, our goal is to study an application independent stochastic system framework, and investigate a dynamic data modification attack, which we refer to as under-the-radar attack. The key intuition behind the study of this class of attacks is the following. In a dynamic framework, every action of the adversary causes an instantaneous loss in utility and simultaneously results in an altering of the system dynamics as perceived by the physical system controller. Consequently, if the controller has prior knowledge of the typical system dynamics, the change in posterior distribution of incoming data can be used effectively to detect the presence of the adversary. From the adversary's perspective, there are two factors to balance, the tangible reward due to loss in system utility and detectability factor which we measure using a distance metric between the prior and posterior dynamics. Note that the problem as studied here is one of privacy as desired by the adversary while still compromising the operation of the system. Specifically, we present a framework to characterize the tradeoff between the utility loss and the Kullback-Liebler distance between the prior and posterior probability distributions of the captured stream. The K-L distance (or information divergence) is an accepted measure of detectability in hypothesis testing problems [9] , and in this work, the detection of the presence or absence of the adversary can be viewed as a hypothesis testing problem as conducted by the control system under attack.
In this work, Markovian dynamics are used to model the prior distribution of the discrete time stochastic process representing the incoming data. In recent years Markov models and in particular discrete time Markov decision processes have been used to model CPSs such as autonomous driving [10] and water monitoring systems [11] . Classical Markov modeled systems such as Linear Quadratic Gaussian control systems (which have broad applicability to CPS), when discretized would also fit the work in this paper. Within the framework of MDPs, part of the data is vulnerable to be modified by the adversary who is aware of the prior dynamics and the detectability threshold of the controller. Under this model, the contributions of the paper are as follows. When the adversary has complete control of the incoming data, or if the state evolution is independent of input, the problem is reduced to a linearly solvable control problem as studied in [12] which provides an exact characterization of the adversary's optimal strategy and the optimal tradeoff between detectability and utility loss. For a general Markovian model, the optimal solution requires the solution of a continuous action Markov Decision Process (MDP) which become computationally impractical as the time horizon increases. For the general case, an achievable tradeoff between detectability and tangible rewards is presented using a greedy heuristic which can be characterized analytically. The proposed model is applied to a networking problem of practical interest, wherein an adversary modifies the timing of an incoming packet stream to a router so as to determine the flow of packets downstream from the router. This problem is studied from the adversary perspective wherein the goal is to balance two costs-the adversary's privacy cost measured by the K-L divergence and the network privacy cost measured by the maximum length of the packet stream whose paths can be hidden by a memory limited router. In this example, it is shown that the general formulation is solvable and yields the optimal adversary strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system model is described in Section II. When the inputs follow an i.i.d arrival distribution, the optimal tradeoffs between utility and K-L divergence, and the optimal adversary policies are derived in Section III. When the inputs follow Markovian dynamics, or an internal controller state is included in the formulation, the tradeoffs and policies are presented in Section IV. The network anonymity application is described and solved in detail in Section V, followed by concluding remarks in Section VI.
A. Related Work
The study of false data injection in cyber physical systems has focused on specific applications, most notably, power systems or the smart grid. Attacks on power system state estimation, such as compromising phasor measurement unit (PMU) data streams, has drawn a lot of recent attention due to its potential impact to cripple a national infrastructure. A good majority of the studies have considered "one-shot" attacks [1] , [2] , wherein an adversary identifies the minimum number of data sources to compromise such that the system moves to an alternate state than the actual one, whilst maintaining perfect complete undetectability of his presence. The undetectability results typically rely on the internal security and stability assessment utilizing static estimation techniques. Introducing dynamics into the security measures can significantly improve the detectability of one-shot attacks. For instance, [13] [14] [15] consider continuous-time power system models and apply dynamic techniques to detect malicious data injection. In [14] , an accurate power network descriptor model is used and necessary and sufficient conditions for identifiability of attacks based on the network topology are derived, and in [6] dynamic detection and identification procedures based on tools from geometric control theory are proposed to detect power network component failure due to false data injection. Dynamic data injection attacks were also studied in the context of linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) systems [7] , [8] , wherein the authors study estimation and control when some of the sensors or actuators are corrupted by an attacker with an application in power networks. Specifically, they are concerned with the number of attacks or errors that can be detected and corrected within a specified time as a function of the parameters of system dynamics. They characterize fundamental limits on undetectability of attacks and also provide a secure local control loop design that can make the system more resilient to these attacks. Note that the work in [6] [7] [8] , [16] , and [17] also study the problem of false data injection in dynamical systems (LQG controllers and Kalman filter based estimation systems) which is thematically similar to our work. Part of the focus there is on understanding system properties that enable detection of the best adversary over a period of time. A key difference between our model and the work in these references is the MDP model is an open-loop model based on finite state probabilistic automatons whereas LQG and Kalman filter based systems are feedback controllers working with real valued parameters.
Yet another specific application where false data injection has been studied theoretically is the introduction of Byzantine data in Bayesian distributed detection [18] , [19] . In Bayesian distributed detection, a group of sensors transmit observations to a fusion center which uses the received data to perform a hypothesis testing problem on the underlying source of observations. In the Byzantine version of the problem explored in [18] and [19] , the authors included an adversary who compromised a fraction of sensors and determined the most effective attacking strategy of the Byzantine nodes that limits the hypothesis testing performance. Their approach was based on Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) as a probabilistic distance between the legitimate and Byzantine data, and aims to maximize the performance of Bayesian detection under a limited Byzantine attack assuming the attack is undetectable and the data are independent across time. While our proposed approach is also based on using an informational distance measure to quantify the deviation of data from the legitimate statistical prior, it is used to study the tension from the adversary perspective between preserving his detectability and ability to reduce system utility. The critical challenge in our work is the dynamic nature of the system and the acausal relationship between the key variables in the system.
The problem as we explore in this article is similar to a class of cyberattacks referred to by the mnemonic "Frog-Boiling" [20] , [21] , wherein typical intrusion and anomaly detectors of network traffic are fooled by modifying the data streams gradually so that detectors that can maintain limited history of data fail to detect the anomalies built up over several time steps. The work we present here is a theoretical foundational approach operating on the same principle. Fig. 1 illustrates the system model used in this work.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL Data Arrival Inputs arrive to the controller according to a discrete time stochastic process with wide sense stationary Markovian dynamics. We specifically divide the input into two separate streams
denotes the input data at time step n. X, Y represent the legitimate inputs, wherein the initial pair x 0 , y 0 is fixed and the inputs at subsequent time points are distributed according to the stationary transition probability matrix P st = {p i j |kl i, k ∈ X , j, l ∈ Y} and Pr{X n+1 = k, Y n+1 = l|X n = i, Y n = j } = p i j |kl for all n. We represent the inputs by a pair of streams X, Y to separate the stream X which can be modified by the adversary from the stream Y which is not accessible to him. In practice, the stream Y could denote information flowing through protected data links, or internal system information that is unavailable to the adversary.
Controller Reward The underlying physical system receives the inputs and performs actions that result in a utility value, denoted by a function u : X × Y → R + . In practice, the underlying system has an internal state and, depending on the history, current inputs and state, the controller takes an appropriate action that maximizes the net utility achieved. In this work, our goal is to study the adversarial perspective, and for this purpose the internal actions and internal state of the controller are abstracted into the instantaneous utility function u(·, ·). In section IV we will include an explicit internal state variable in the model and derive the corresponding solutions. The controller is equipped with an intrusion detection mechanism whose goal is to identify the presence or absence of adversarial modification using prior knowledge of the legitimate input dynamics.
Adversary The adversary is assumed to have complete access to the data stream X, wherein the data can be modified without restriction prior to being received by the controller. For most of our subsequent results we shall assume that the adversary can observe the stream Y but not modify the data on it. We denote the modified input stream byX = X 1 ,X 2 , · · · ; the adversary's goal is to generate the modified streamX such that the net utility of the controller is minimized whilst remaining stealthy of the intrusion detection mechanism described thenceforth. We assume, for the most part, that the adversary is privy to the internal state process of the controller. 1 Intrusion Detection The controller is equipped with an intrusion detection mechanism which is modeled as a hypothesis testing between the presence and absence of the adversary. Specifically, the mechanism uses the observed inputsX, Y for the statistical inference. In this work we do not explicitly model the hypothesis testing, but instead use the Kullback-Liebler divergence between the posterior distribution of (X, Y) generated by the adversary and the prior distribution P as a measure of detectability of the adversary's presence. It is well known that under constraints on the false alarm probability, the K-L distance thus computed bounds the probability of missed-detection which the adversary aims to maximize. Adversary Policy and Net Reward Under this system model, the action of the adversary is modeled by the causal conditional distribution:
which we denote using the policy notation μ. For an n step process, the adversary's goal is to design a policy that maximizes the net reward measured by a weighted sum of the utility of the controller and the K-L divergence between the posterior and prior distributions, given by
where
is the K-L divergence between the posterior and prior distributions of the observed inputs. The goal of the adversary is to design the policy μ * that maximizes the above reward. Inherent in the above discussion is the fact that it is in the adversary's best interests to chose the optimal policy μ * despite knowing that the controller is aware of the optimal policy μ * and can design a detector that uses the observed inputs to identify whether the inputs were generated using the prior distribution or the posterior distribution (that is an outcome of the known optimal policy μ * ). In practice, the optimal distribution q n is used to randomly generate a specific action (choice of inputX n ) which results in a specific utility and K-L cost achieved by the adversary, which when averaged over the ensemble provides the derived optimal reward. The controller, knowing that the adversary-if he exists-is likely to use the optimal strategy, would perform the hypothesis testing accordingly and flag an alert if the detection metric exceeds a certain threshold. The controller's hypothesis testing is not explicitly considered in this work, but instead abstracted using the K-L distance.
We note that K-L distance requires that the posterior distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to the prior, which in essence limits the adversarial strategies. If the absolute continuity condition were violated, or in other words, the adversary transmitted an input that were not in the prior support, then the presence of the adversary would be revealed instantly, and consequently such scenarios are not considered in this work.
Based on the described model, in the next section, we characterize explicitly the optimal policy of the adversary when the incoming process is i.i.d, and subsequently extend the results for the general Markovian model and when an internal state process is included in Section IV. The optimal solution to the general process is expressed as a solution to a continuous state-action Markov Decision Process.
III. OPTIMAL TRADEOFF AND ADVERSARY POLICY FOR i.i.d INPUT STREAMS
We first consider a simple system where the inputs to the controller is temporally an i.i.d. process. Mathematically,
As mentioned in the mathematical model, the instantaneous cost incurred by the adversary in the process is composed of the utility cost and the detectability cost. While the utility cost is a function of instantaneous inputs, u(X n , y n ) (adversary absent) or u(X n , y n ) (adversary present), the penalty due to the data modification is measured by the K-L divergence. When the input sequence is i.i.d, the K-L divergence between the distributions P andP can be split as:
which is a sum of causal independent terms across time steps. Inherent in the above expansion is the fact that the adversary also chooses a policy independent across time steps. Without proof, we state that this is optimal since the adversary has nothing to gain from a utility perspective using the memory of past actions and the K-L divergence between the distribution of an i.i.d sequence and that of a sequence with memory is higher than that between two i.i.d sequences generated using the marginal distributions. As the compromised input at any given timeX n has dependency only with the inaccessible input Y n , the action to change the probability distribution of X n is a conditional probability Pr{X n |y n }. The unchanged joint probability Pr{X n , Y n } and changed probability Pr{X n |y n } in the analysis below are denoted as p(X, Y ) and q(X) respectively. In the following, the optimal adversary behavior is analyzed depending on whether the adversary can observe the data arriving from input stream Y or not.
A. Scenario I: Analysis With Perfect Side Information
Theorem 1: Let V * n denote the optimal weighted cost as a function of the inputs x n , y n realized from the random input variables X n , Y n at time n. Then
where the optimal action of the adversary is given by
where iid 1 is the normalization constant. Proof: Since the inputs are i.i.d and there is no memory utilized in the system dynamics, the optimal cost V * n at time n as a function of the inputs is given by solving the the greedy optimality equation from the expected cost-to-go function:
The minimization uses the idea of K-L minimization similar to linearly solvable control in [12] to derive the optimal policy and cost. The proof details are provided in the appendix as a corollary to the proof of Theorem 2.
B. Scenario II: Analysis With Unobservable Side Information
When the side information is observable to the adversary, the achieved utility when the adversary throws away the legitimate input and generates an input with identical distribution to the prior would be perfectly undetectable (and no utility change either) which is a consequence of the use of expected rewards as a metric. For there to be a difference between two sources of input using identical distributions, one legitimate and the other illegal, there ought to be side information related to the actual input which can be used to measure the deviation. The unmodified input stream Y can be viewed as this side information which the controller can use to track the possibly modified input stream X. In particular, when the side information (or state) is not observable to the adversary, his ability to maintain his "stealthiness" is likely to reduce further. In the scenario where the adversary is not able to eavesdrop on input stream Y, only prior knowledge of the probability distribution of Y n can be used to derive the optimal policy and cost. Since the prior distribution of Y n is a fixed i.i.d distribution dependent on the observed input X n , the optimal action at time n is also dependent on the observed input X n at time n. In the expression below, q(X) refers to Pr(X |X n ) and x ∈ X . Since the adversary cannot observe Y n , at best he can compute the marginal distribution ofX n from the controller's perspective using his belief about Y n given the observed X n . In other words, if
then the K-L divergence between posterior and prior as computed by the adversary is given by
The cost minimization function can be written as
Theorem 2: When the adversary cannot observe the input sequence Y, the optimal cost
and the optimal action to obtain above cost is given by
where iid 2 is the normalization constant. Proof: The proof follows a similar optimization technique as in Theorem 2.
Note that when side information is available, the optimal adversary strategy does not depend on the original data X n . This is a virtue of the i.i.d assumption wherein if the adversary were to choose a policy dependent on the original data X, through a conditional distribution Pr{X n |X n , Y n }, since the controller does not have access to the original data, the cost function would only be expressed as an expectation over the original data in which case, an equal cost can be obtained using the marginal policy Pr{X n |Y n }. However, when side information is unavailable, the optimal action and tradeoff is dependent on the observed input X n since the observed input provides information about the unobservable input which in turn influences the expected costs at that time step.
A simple example to illustrate the trade off between the utility cost and detectability cost performed on a binary input model in Figure 2 . The input tuple (X i , Y i ) ∈ ({0, 0}, {0, 1}, {1, 0}, {1, 1}) is generated randomly from an arbitrary joint probability distribution Pr(x = 0, y = 0) = 0.1546, Pr(x = 0, y = 1) = 0.1546, Pr(x = 1, y = 0) = 0.2989 and 
By spanning the optimization across different values of λ, a tradeoff between the utility and detectability can be obtained, which is illustrated in Figure 2 .
As observed when adversary chooses to remain completely private (K-L cost is 0), the achieved utility does not depend on whether the adversary can observe the input Y or not. Since maximum stealth (minimum detectability) implies that the adversary retains the prior distribution of inputs, this observation follows. As expected, the tradeoff for the perfect side information is an inner bound on the tradeoff when side information is not observable. This is true mathematically; when optimizing the policy with perfect side information, the adversary can choose to ignore the available information to derive a sub-optimal policy. We shall use this argument to derive an inner bound for the general Markovian framework.
IV. ADVERSARY POLICY AND COST UNDER GENERAL MARKOVIAN FRAMEWORK

A. Continuous State-Action General MDP Formulation for Markov Inputs and Utility Independent of Controller's State
In the general Markovian framework, the adversary can arguably use the complete history (until time n−1) of the original and modified data sequence when designing the policy for state at time period n. However, we will present an argument that the adversary's state can be effectively captured using four variables namelyX n−1 , Y n−1 , X n , Y n . First, for any adversary policy that utilizes data variables for any time steps prior to n − 1, the total accrued utility reward can be equivalently obtained using the marginal distribution conditioned only on the present variables. Second, due to the Markovian nature of the incoming data, the difference in K-L rewards between the original policy and the marginalized policy is always positive (since mutual information is always greater than zero).
Consequently it is sufficient for the adversary to design a Markov policy based on one step memory alone.
For such a Markovian policy, the K-L cost can be split into a sum of causal rewards as
The reader must note that the inputs at time n, X n and Y n are only a part of the information to define the state of the adversary process. The state of the adversary will consist of the current value of input Y n and X n (original), input X n−1 (changed) and Y n−1 in the previous time step. Note that in the i.i.d case, the original data X n was not included in the decision making due to the nature of the K-L cost which results in an expectation over the original data and is thus not necessary. However, under Markovian dynamics, the present value of X n is required for the adversary to estimate the expected future rewards which are a function of X n+1 , Y n+1 which in turn depend on the current X n through the Markov transition probability matrix.
1) Optimal Tradeoff and Adversary Policy With Perfect Side Information:
The formulation of a finite horizon general MDP with continuous-state action will require following definitions:
. The outcomes of the random state observed at any particular time step n, i.e. z n = (x n , y n ,x n−1 , y n−1 ) is sufficient information available to the adversary.
• Action: Continuous action space q n ∈ [0, 1] such that q n : Z → Pr(X n ∈ X :X n = x n ). is the probability mass function for the changed inputX n that depends on the current process state Z n .
• Transition Probability Function: F(z n+1 | z n , q n ) = P × q n is the controlled transition of current state
on applying an action q n , where the tilde denotes that a matrix operation is done to exchange the 2nd element in the vector resulting from P × q n with the last one. Recollect that P is the stationary transition probability of uncontrolled markov chain describing the arrival of inputs from streams X and Y.
• Instantaneous Cost Function: C q n n is the weighted sum of the utility cost and the detectability cost for the adversary given by
is the conditional probability based on the prior distribution. While the state is known to the adversary, the utility cost is an expectation over the action q n in the problem formulation. The adversary uses the optimal probability distribution, q n (X n ) and randomly picks a value ofX n = x n at each time step which achieves the derived reward in an expected sense. Having defined the problem at every time step, we can make a finite horizon stochastic planning of the best possible actions or a policy μ = {q 0 , q 1 , · · · q n , · · · , q L } for L time epochs to minimize the total expected cost.
Theorem 3: When the input sequence Y is perfectly observable to the adversary, let V * n denote the optimal cost-togo at time step n. Then the optimal cost for the weighted optimization at time step n is given by
1 − λ and the optimal action is given by
where m1 is the normalization constant.
Proof: The recursive Bellman equation for finite horizon case is given by
The reduction of the above equation to the form in the theorem is provided in the appendix.
2) Optimal Tradeoff and Adversary Policy With Unobservable Side Information: When the realizations of input sequence Y are unobservable to the adversary, the state, as defined in the general MDP problem is not completely observable and therefore, the process is similar to a partially observable Markov Decision Process. Accordingly, the adversary maintains a belief vector over Y using the data sequence from input stream X. If the prior belief (prior to observing X n ) and posterior belief (after observing X n ) of Y n at any time step n are given by π n (y n ) and π n, po (y n ) respectively, the belief updates in step n are as follows:
In place of the variables Y n , Y n−1 which are unavailable, the sufficient state for the adversary is constituted by the pair of beliefs π n−1, po , π n, po along with the observed variables X n , X n−1Xn−1 . Conditioned on this new state, which we denote by the random variable ζ n (realization ϑ n ), the adversary modifies the probability distribution function ofX n , which we denote by q n (x). As with the i.i.d model when the side information was unavailable to the adversary, the best he can do is to compute the K-L divergence between the modified and unmodified marginal distributions. In effect, the single step K-L cost for the adversary can be written as
Employing this cost into the backward induction mechanism, we get the following theorem for the optimal cost-to-go function.
Theorem 4: The optimal weighted reward at time step n for the general Markovian input system when side information is unobservable is given by
by taking optimal action
where m2 is the normalization constant and,
Proof: The optimal cost for the weighted optimization when side information is unavailable to the adversary is given by the solution to the recursive Bellman equation for the finite horizon case
The rest of the proof relies on the reduction used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Although backward induction can be used to solve for the optimal policy and actions as a function of the belief and state, this process is computationally impractical for more than a few time steps due to uncountable belief space (simplex over Y). In the subsequent section, we therefore briefly discuss methodologies to compute bounds on the optimal tradeoff that are computationally feasible.
3) Outer Bound on the Optimal Tradeoff: Any sub optimal policy for the adversary would result in an outer bound on the tradeoff between utility and detectability costs. We propose the computation of an outer bound using a greedy heuristic wherein the adversary chooses an action distribution q n that optimizes the instantaneous rewards and ignores the rewards in future time steps. When side information is unobservable, the one-step greedy policy when applied yields the optimal cost as which depends on the belief over Y n . The action probability to achieve the optimal greedy cost turns out to be
Since the greedy policy only maximizes instantaneous rewards, it can be causally computed (no backward induction) at every time step and is easy to implement.
4) Inner Bound on the Optimal Tradeoff:
Note that when the side information is observable, a sub optimal adversary can choose to ignore the available information, and any policy thus derived will obtain a tradeoff worse than the optimal adversary who uses the available side information. Stated differently, the optimal tradeoff derived for the adversary with perfect side information will serve as an inner bound to evaluate any policy derived for the adversary without side information, for instance, the greedy policy described above.
We illustrate these ideas for the general MDP framework by taking an example of binary model. The input space and utility functions are defined exactly as in the i.i.d binary input model. The 4 × 4 stationary transition probability matrix P for the input is chosen to have a form
For simulation, the value of α, β, γ , δ are arbitrarily assigned as 0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4 respectively. The tradeoff for the greedy policy when side information is unavailable is compared with the optimal tradeoff when side information is available. The results are plotted in Figure 3 .
B. Continuous State-Action General MDP Formulation for i.i.d Inputs With Controller's Internal State Evolution Observable
There has been no notion of Controller's State in the theoretical analysis so far. We have only considered a stylized model of the controlled dynamical system in which the incoming data to the controller directly results in its utility. In typical cyber physical systems, controllers have internal state processes which evolve as functions of the inputs and controller actions. In this section, we expand our analysis by modeling the internal state process of the controller using Markovian dynamics. Specifically, the physical system has an instantaneous internal state S t at time instant t, where S t ∈ S is a discrete random variable. The system receives the inputs and performs actions that result in an internal state transition, which is denoted by the stationary transition probability w x,y (s , s) = Pr(S n+1 = s | S n = s, X n = x, Y n = y). As mentioned in Section II, the optimal controller policy (actions) are assumed to be solved for (and history independent,) 2 and consequently the transition probability can be denoted using an action independent distribution w x,y (s , s) . Likewise, the utility is also dependent on the controller's state S n along with the inputs at time step n and is denoted as u(S n , X n , Y n ). Note that when the internal state process is part of the system dynamics, there is a Markovian evolution even with i.i.d inputs. In the following analysis, we shall consider the two input sequences to be i.i.d in nature and have a joint distribution p(X, Y ). The adversary also has complete information about the input sequences and the internal state sequence.
We note that the term state used in the paper denotes the state of the adversary's optimization. We shall continue to use it thus and apply the terminology "internal state" to denote the internal state of the controller. The state of the adversary in this model at time n is (S n , Y n ) due to the i.i.d assumption. The value of original input variable X n is irrelevant for the identical reason as stated in the beginning of Section III. In the following we derive the optimal policy and action for the internal state based model.
Theorem 5: When the internal state is observable to adversary, the optimal cost for the weighted optimization is given by
Proof: The recursive Bellman's equation for finite horizon case is given by
and the rest of the proof is a straightforward extension of Theorem 2.
Note that although the inputs are i.i.d, the optimal solution requires a backward induction as stated in the theorem. This is, as mentioned earlier, an outcome of the state introducing temporal dependency across the adversarial actions. That being said, the availability of the state information results in a straightforward optimization of the action and the cost-to-go function in the Bellman equation.
C. Continuous State-Action General MDP Formulation for i.i.d. Inputs With Controller's Internal State Evolution Unobservable
When the controller's internal state is unobservable to adversary, the overall adversary state is (π n (S n ), Y n )) that includes the adversary's belief π n (S n ) = Pr{S n |Y n 1 ,X n 1 } over the controller's state S n . Based on this prior belief and the input Y n observed, the adversary modifies the input toX using a probability distribution conditioned on the state (π n (S n ), y n )), which we denote by q n (x). Due to the adversarial data modification, the instantaneous utility cost as measurable by the adversary is given by E π n E q n [u(S n ,X n , y n )]. Since there is no feedback from the state evolution to the input process, the adversary, unlike in the situation with unobservable side information, is not required to maintain a prior and posterior belief. The present input y n , modified inputx n and the belief over present state π n can be used to obtain the belief of the state in the subsequent step as:
The optimal adversary cost from the weighted optimization is given by the solution to the recursive Bellman equation for finite horizon case of non-observable controller's state and i.i.d input process
When the state is unobservable to the adversary, the problem of reducing the Bellman equation beyond its stated form above is as yet intractable. The primary difference between unobservable state and unobservable side information (under Markovian dynamics) is the fact that unlike the side information which evolves as an uncontrolled Markov chain with fixed transition probability, the state evolution depends on the adversary action through the modified input processX. Consequently the minimization in the Bellman equation is complicated by the non-standard dependence between the action and subsequent belief. We can however derive inner and outer bounds on the optimal tradeoff as was done in Section IV-A3. An outer bound can be obtained using the greedy heuristic, wherein the action is applied to maximize the expected instantaneous reward. The optimal value function obtained on applying greedy policy is
which is obtained by applying an optimal action probability
While the greedy policy provides an outer bound, the optimal tradeoff between utility and detectability cost for the adversary who can perfectly observe the state would serve as an inner bound to the tradeoff when the state is not observable. Thus far in the preceding discussion we have considered the optimal action and the detectability-utility cost tradeoff for the adversary under different scenarios. In the most general model, wherein the inputs are Markovian and the internal state and side information are not observable to the adversary, the resulting optimization would combine the POMDP framework as described in Section IV with the state evolution factor described above; since further simplification of the Bellman equation is intractable as yet, this has been omitted here for ease of presentation. In the rest of this work, we present in detail, a practical example of an internal state based system which can be solved analytically using recursive optimization.
We consider the binary example in Section III and introduce an internal state whose transitions occur with arriving inputs. Let the controller exist in two states, denoted by S 1 and S 2 . where X n and Y n are the inputs arrived at controller at time n. Figure 4 plots the optimal tradeoff between utility and detectability for the adversary who can observe the internal state process and the sub optimal tradeoff derived from the greedy heuristic when the adversary cannot observe the internal state process.
V. APPLICATION IN THE STUDY OF ADMISSIBLE LENGTH IN ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION
In any datagram network, timing analysis can be used to trace flows of packets and thus can compromise users' anonymity [23] , [24] . Specifically, the correlation between incoming and outgoing streams at shared routers induced by the router scheduling policy can be used to track flows from sources to corresponding destinations. On the Internet, senders' anonymity is achieved using networks of Chaum mixes [25] . Chaum mixes are relay nodes or proxy servers that use a combination of encryption, packet padding and random reordering to obfuscate the source destination information of a packet. Specifically, every user transmits packets to the desired destination through a sequence of mix nodes. Each packet is encrypted in layers using public key encryption such that, every mix on the path decrypts a layer of encryption, determines the identity of the subsequent mix on the path, and transmits the packet to that mix, which in turn removes the next layer of encryption and so on. The anonymous system Tor [26] is a popular mix network used by more than half a million users.
Encryption and packet padding, however, serve only to limit information retrieval from the contents of packets. To limit the information retrieval through timing analysis, mixes typically wait until they receive packets from multiple users, randomly reorder the collected packets and transmit them in batches, thus reducing the correlation between the timing on incoming and outgoing flows. As expected, the anonymity achievable from timing analysis severely deteriorates in the presence of resource constraints on the mix such as limited memory and bandwidth. Consider a router in a data network serving packet streams from two users with equal arrival rates as shown in Figure 5 . If an eavesdropper does not observe any arrival or departure process, and has no prior knowledge about the sources of outgoing links, the probability of associating an outgoing link with any particular source would be the prior probability (in this case 1 2 for each user). A mixing strategy provides perfect anonymity, if it ensures that the probability of Eve predicting the outgoing links of users correctly remains 1 2 , independent of the number of packets observed. No mixing strategy can, however, provide perfect anonymity using a limited buffer capacity; this can be ascertained from the fact that for a random arrival model, the probability that the sequence of arrivals contains a preponderance of packets from a single source exceeds the finite buffer size is non zero. A formal proof of this statement can be found in [27] .
In effect, the objective of a memory limited mix is to maintain perfect anonymity for as long as possible, whereas the objective of the adversary is to detect the source of outgoing packets as quickly as possible. In [27] , the maximum average length of the packet stream-referred to as admissible length-for which the mix can maintain perfect anonymity was evaluated for a variety of scenarios. In each of the scenarios, the mix's goal is to use a scheduling policy so that the admissible length is maximized, whereas the adversary's goal is to match the outgoing links with the respective sources as quickly as possible, or in other words, reduce the admissible length. Note that the admissible length is directly related to the duration of time before which the adversary can perfectly match the incoming and outgoing streams. In this work, we study the admissible length when the adversary can control the incoming timing in one of the processes. 3 In [30] , this problem was studied when the adversary had limited ability to modify the timing (by capturing a finite number of packets). Here we make no limiting assumptions on the adversary ability, but instead study the problem wherein the adversary aims to optimize the tradeoff between the admissible length and the detectability of his presence which fits into the main theoretical model described in this work.
A. System Model
We characterize the system model under following headings:
• Arrival Process Arrival process is a discrete-time system which is independent for both the users. For ease of understanding we refer to packets from the two users and red and blue packets respectively. Packets arrive at each time step according to Bernoulli process with associated probability of arrival defined below for 2 users system. P r : p r = probability that a red packet arrives 1 − p r = probability that a red packet does not arrive Similarly, P b : p b = probability that a blue packet arrives 1 − p b = probability that a blue packet does not arrive
• Chaum Mix The mix receives packets from both the users and transmits a pair of packets, one from each user, every time the buffer contains at least one packet from each user. The maximum number of packets that can be stored in the buffer is m. However, when the buffer is full of packets from only one user, the mix is forced to transmit on only one stream (and not a pair) thus revealing the source of the outgoing stream to the adversary. The total number of slots until this event occurs is defined as the admissible length of the system. In [27] , transmitting packets from each user when the buffer has packets from all the users has been proved to be optimal strategy for maximizing admissible length. Optimal Mixing Strategy Note that the adversary determines the source of an outgoing stream by analyzing the correlations between the timing on incoming and outgoing streams. Consequently, as long as each outgoing stream is equally correlated to all incoming streams, the system will remain in perfect anonymity (each stream equally likely to belong to each source). More specifically, if the mix ensures that at all times the number of departed packets on any outgoing link is less than the minimum number of arrivals across all incoming links, then it is possible to design a scheduling policy for all outgoing streams to have identical timing, thus maintaining perfect anonymity. This idea was used in [27] to prove that the optimal strategy for the mix is to transmit one packet of each user if and only if at least one packet from each user is present in the buffer and the buffer is not full. If the buffer is full and only packets from one user are present, then the mix is forced to transmit a single packet, at which point any adversary can identify the source of that outgoing stream. The expected number of slots required to reach this condition is defined as the admissible length of the system. • Adversary: The adversary is allowed to alter the dynamics of the red packet arrival process. In effect the arrival probability of a red packet can be altered in every slot. In practice this can be accomplished by capturing packets or regenerating old packets by modifying acknowledgments. The objective of the adversary is to shorten the time in which the buffer is filled with packets from one user only. The adversary can only modify the red packet stream but can observe the packets on the blue packet stream. 1) Adversary MDP Model: By virtue of the Bernoulli arrival model and the mixing strategy, the buffer can only contain packets from one user. Since the mixing strategy is deterministic, the adversary can perfectly determine the number of packets present in the mix's buffer at every time slot. This scenario therefore falls under the observable internal state-input adversary model described in Section IV-C Following are the specifics of the model as it pertains to this problem.
2) Time Horizon: The time horizon is infinite but the process has a stopping condition (when the buffer is full and a new packet arrives from the same source as that of the packets in the buffer).
3) Inputs:
The two input processes {X n } and {Y n } are i.i.d Bernoulli processes with probabilities p r and p b respectively.
4) Internal State:
The internal state at time n is defined as the number of red packets in the buffer or the negative of the number of blue packets in the buffer. The state transition is deterministic given the inputs.
5) Utility Cost:
The utility cost measures the admissible length which is incremented by 1 at every step until the state reaches one of the boundaries M + 1 or −M − 1. In other words
At any state s, let ϕ(s) denote the utility cost-to-go in the absence of any adversarial modification. Then, ϕ(s) can be solved using the following recursion:
The proof of the above equation is available in [27] and is a special case of the Bellman equation derived in Section IV where the adversary has no actions and λ = 0. The solution to the above recursion using boundary conditions, ϕ(m + 1) = ϕ(−m − 1) = 0 is found to be
Now, consider a situation where adversary is allowed to change the dynamics of the red packet stream and eavesdrops to know the arrival information of blue(B) packets at each time step. Following the model is Section IV, the adversary's state at time n is given by the pair (S n , Y n ).When the current state is (s, B = 0), let the probability of a red packet arrival (as altered by the adversary) be denoted by q r (y, B = 0) and the action probability function Q r = [q r (1 − q r )]. Similarly, when the process state is (s, B = 1), the probability mass function is denoted asQ r = [q r (1 −q r )]. The problem is formulated as infinite horizon total cost MDP in which the action is continuous. Let the value function at state (s, B) be denoted by ϑ (s, B) .
The boundary conditions are then modified accordingly as
The Bellman equation to minimize the weighted cost for the adversary, following the result in Section IV, is given by 
where, 1 {A} is the indicator function identifying even A. Theorem 6: In a system of two users which generate packets with equal probability and a chaum mix with buffer capacity m, when the adversary can control the probability of arrival of one input stream while eavesdropping the arrival of packets from other stream, the admissible length is given by
where,
Proof: Using the technique similar to the theory developed in sec III and IV implemented for the infinite horizon average reward MDP, the average cost to fill the mix's buffer starting from any buffer state is found out. Details are available in the appendix.
The admissible length is plotted against the detectability (K-L cost) in Figure 6 . These tradeoffs are plotted for different initial state of the mix's buffer. For a system that initializes with an empty buffer the outer curve represents the adversarial detectability-utility tradeoff. When maximum stealth (zero detectability) of the adversary is imposed (no detectability), the admissible length expectedly converges to the result in [27] given by 4[(m +1) 2 −s 2 ]. Figure 7 plots the admissible length as a function of the initial buffer state; interestingly although the mix can only alter the red packet dynamics, the admissible length-to-go as a function of the internal buffer state is symmetric-identical stopping time regardless of whether the buffer contains blue or red packets.
A Note on Countermeasures
The natural counterpart to the adversary perspective discussed thus far in this paper is that of the intrusion detection mechanism as implemented within the control system. To that end, Figures 8(a) and 8(b) plot the empirical K-L divergence between the observed data pattern and the prior (or expected) data pattern. The empirical K-L divergence can be computed using the empirical probability distribution of the state transitions on the pair of inputs, as when compared to the underlying prior probability distribution. From the figure one can discern that as the adversary reduces the weight on the detectability, the detection statistics increase and consequently his actions are more detectable. As noted in the figures, the performance by an adversary with knowledge of side information is apparently more detectable than one without side information. The primary reason for this is that as optimized, the utility function when side information is unavailable is taken as expectation over all possible side information Y which limits the ability of the adversary to increase his utility beyond a certain degree. In effect although the detectability of such an adversary is apparently lower for the same weight, the resulting utility for the adversary is also proportionately lower. In effect the availability of side information to the adversary emboldens him to cause additional damage to the system albeit at the cost of higher detectability.
Any detection mechanism that uses such an empirical statistic would likely apply a threshold depending on its tolerance for false alarm and requirement on detection rate. Depending on the chosen threshold, were the adversary to operate under the threshold his actions may fall into the "missed detection" category and he would thus remain undetected, and were he to operate above the threshold his actions would be detected whilst causing higher damage to system operation. We do note that this is a specific example of detection statistics that can feed countermeasures but are not necessarily optimal. We do note that when the controller is aware of the attacker's policy, then the KL divergence as derived by the attacker would be a tight bound assuming the controller utilizes an optimal detection mechanism. Were the attacker to use an alternate policy (which would have higher KL divergence than μ * ), the higher KL would result in easier detectability by the controller.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work, we presented a model to study dynamic under-the-radar attacks by an adversary on a dynamical system. Here, the adversary is trying to impact a system without revealing his presence. Using a weighted reward that included the utility cost and the K-L divergence, we characterized analytically, under different conditions on the underlying system dynamics, the tradeoff between the tangible impact to the system and the adversary's "stealthiness". For the Markovian model, we note that the independence over time for the attacker's policy is a mathematical consequence of the positivity of KL divergence and the fact that the randomness in one state transition is independent of the previous. Intuitively, were the adversary to use a strategy that wasnt memoryless, then the dependency across time would serve as additional information revealing his presence. A natural way forward beyond intrusion detection would be the design of countermeasures that alter the controller strategy having detected the adversary presence to obtain a desired performance whilst showing resistance to intrusion. We believe that a stochastic/multistage game formulation that includes detection and mitigation as controller actions would serve as a likely framework for the course of such an investigation.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1, 2
It is well known that the K-L divergence between two probability distributions D(q(x) | p(x)) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if q(x) = p(x)∀x. This follows from the fact that for any function g : X → R + , q(x) = g(x)
x g(x) minimizes the divergence expansion:
x q(x) log
The reductions in the different proofs in this work shall use the above as a fact. For a Markovian input stream with observable side information:
Using the optimal divergence expansion stated at the beginning of the proof, the Optimal cost function,
x p X (x)exp
where m1 is the normalization constant. Corollary: We follow from the the above solution for optimal action probability when the input stream is I.I.D in nature. In that case, the expected future reward need not be considered to take a decision at the present state. The optimal decision for a given state will be independent of time n. In this scenario, the formulated problem for the markov case will be reduced to
B. Proof of Theorem 6
We minimize 
Q r (i ) log We are now left to solve the homogeneous non-linear recurrence equation (6) and (7) . Substituting, 
Using the boundary conditions, we determine unknown coefficients to be
.
This gives the values of ϑ(s, 0) and ϑ(s, 1).
